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Over the past several years, the United States Supreme Court has been limiting
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' During this same period, the Court has emphasized the
importance of state sovereignty and has expanded the constitutional protections
afforded the states under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. 2  These
developments notwithstanding, commentators seem confident that the treaty power
is and will remain virtually plenary, even if the federal government might make use
of it to severely undermine the dignity and sovereignty of the states.3 That
confidence is misplaced. While it is difficult to predict what the Court would do
were an appropriate opportunity to present itself, the doctrinal explanations that
would be necessary to support a much less robust treaty power would be much
easier to make than most commentators seem to realize, even if one brackets recent
developments in constitutional law. If one takes those developments into account,
however, it is difficult to understand how the Court could fail to limit the treaty
power were core areas of state law at issue.
This Article does not suggest that the Court should limit the federal
government's ability to make international agreements because doing so would best
account for the developing treaty jurisprudence or would most contribute to peace
and harmony at home or abroad. On the contrary, the claim here is that the Court
seems likely to limit the treaty power, notwithstanding the developingjurisprudence
in that area and notwithstanding what might best promote the interests of the Nation
or the world because the Court would otherwise have to do an abrupt about-face
with respect to its own state sovereignty jurisprudence. The Court would make a
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. I would like to thank
Professor James Beattie for his helpful discussions of these and related issues.
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down provisions
in the Violence Against Women Act because Congress had exceeded its powers under the
Commerce Clause and under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in passing those
provisions).
2 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992);.
3 For example, see generally David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The
Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MIcH. L. REv.
1075 (2000).
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mockery of its own recent paeans to the dignity of the states were it to hold that the
federal government could supplant core areas of state law via treaty or executive
agreement.
Part I of this Article describes the different kinds of international agreements
that might be made, and some of the limitations that might be imposed to limit the
force of those agreements. Part H1 discusses the Court's view that family law is
paradigmatic of what is reserved for the states to regulate, and why the current
Court is likely to suggest that some aspects of state family law cannot be supplanted
by the federal government even via international agreement. The Article concludes
that current commentators seem not to appreciate the degree to which the Court's
dual-sovereignty jurisprudence has changed current constitutional law. It simply
is not credible to argue that the robust state sovereignty recently recognized by the
Court imposes no constraints on the exercise of the treaty power. Unless the
composition or the judicial philosophy of the Court changes, the only plausible
prediction is that the Court will impose constraints on the treaty power, best
interests of the Nation or the world notwithstanding, if it believes that the dignity
and sovereign status of the states would otherwise suffer.
I. ON MAKING AND INTERPRETING TREATIES
The power to make international agreements itself requires elaboration because
it encompasses several kinds of international agreements, each of which will have
the force of law if not in violation of constitutional guarantees. As to whether a
particular international agreement passes constitutional muster, this will depend
upon how that treaty is construed and upon the kinds of limitations imposed by the
Constitution on the power to make such agreements.
Commentators suggest that Missouri v. Holland' and United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.' establish the virtually plenary nature of the treaty power and,
thus, that the only limitations on the reach of a treaty will be imposed by the
language and interpretation of the document itself.6 Yet, this is not the best
characterization of those cases even bracketing current state sovereignty
jurisprudence and certainly cannot plausibly be offered in light of that
jurisprudence. The better interpretation suggests that the treaty power is subject to
as yet unarticulated constitutional limitations.
4 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that in pursuance of a valid treaty, the government could
act under authority of the Constitution, Article VI).
- 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (holding the power to make decisions regarding international
affairs was vested in the President).
6 See infra notes 76-147 and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
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A. The Treaty Power
As an initial matter, it is helpful to understand what kinds of international
agreements might be made.7 The President might make an international agreement
(1) which has not been approved by the House of Representatives or the Senate,
making a "sole executive agreement,"' (2) which has been approved by majority
vote in both the House and the Senate, making a "congressional-executive
agreement," 9 or (3) which has been ratified by a two-thirds vote in the Senate,
making a "treaty"' 0 as described in the Constitution." Each of these agreements can
David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998).
There are basically three procedures which are used.... Under the treaty mode,
the President negotiates an agreement and then seeks the advice and consent of
the Senate.... Under the congressional-executive agreement procedure, in
contrast, the President may conclude an agreement under the authority of an act
of Congress, which, like all other legislation, must be approved by simple
majorities in both houses. Finally, the President sometimes concludes unilateral
executive agreements on his sole authority.
Id. at 1798.
8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 303(4) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] ("[T]he President, on his own authority,
may make an international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his
independent powers under the Constitution."); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power
and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390, 398 (1998) ("Executive agreements
concluded by the President alone are referred to as 'sole executive agreements."').
9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 303(2) ("[T]he President, with the
authorization or approval of Congress, may make an international agreement dealing with any
matter that falls within the powers of Congress and of the President under the Constitution.");
see also Bradley, supra note 8, at 398 ("Executive agreements approved in advance or after
the fact by a majority of both houses of Congress are referred to as 'congressional-executive
agreements."').
"0 The word "treaty" is itself ambiguous. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29-30
(1982) (noting that under international law, "treaty" refers to an international agreement
concluded between sovereigns without specifying the manner in which it was concluded);
Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive
Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671 (1998).
Any written agreement between two or more states governed by international law
is a treaty for purposes of international law. International law does not
distinguish between Article II treaties that have been approved by two-thirds of
the Senate and executive agreements that are signed by the President either with,
or without, the approval of a majority of both houses of Congress. Thus, Article
II treaties and executive agreements bind the United States under international
law with equal force.
Id. at 726.
" See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.... ."); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635, 657 (1853) ("By the Constitution of the
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have the force of law as long as existing constitutional constraints have been
respected. 12
While these are all ways in which international agreements may be made, there
may be important differences among them. For example, it may be that an
international agreement would be valid if made by the President and ratified by the
Senate, but would not be valid if made without that ratification or, perhaps, without
the consent of the Congress. The President's authority to make agreements without
either congressional or Senate (super-majority) approval is limited to those kinds
of issues that are within his or her independent powers 3 - a separate issue beyond
the scope of the discussion here involves how to delimit those powers.14
Suppose that the focus is on the differences, if any, between the permissible
scope of a congressional-executive agreement and of a treaty, narrowly defined.
Views of many commentators to the contrary,"5 the permissible range of the latter
United States, the President has the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
to make treaties provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 8, § 303(1) ("[T]he President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
may make any international agreement of the United States in the form of a treaty."); see also
Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV.
961, 965 (2001) (noting that "the Constitution itself provides only for treaties," i.e., only
international agreements ratified by a two-thirds vote in the Senate); John C. Yoo, Laws as
Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV.
757, 768 (2001) (discussing the "lack of convincing textual or structural support" for
congressional-executive agreements).
12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 303 cmt. j ("Sole executive agreements
within the President's constitutional authority are law of the United States and supreme over
State law."). However, sole executive agreements may not be supreme over federal law. See
Paul, supra note 10, at 727 ("A sole executive agreement could supersede inconsistent state
law, but never federal law."). Treaties and congressional-executive agreements supersede
both state and federal law. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,
108 HARv. L. REv. 799, 805 (1995) ("[Tlhere is no significant difference between the legal
effect of a congressional-executive agreement and the classical treaty approved by two-thirds
of the Senate.").
" See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1221, 1266-67 (1995) ("[Ilt is
necessary to draw boundaries... between those types of international agreements that the
President may, acting alone, make binding on the United States and those agreements -
'treaties' - that the President must submit for Senate or ... [perhaps] congressional
approval."); see also Spiro, supra note 11, at 1005 n.208 ("Limitations on the president's
power to undertake sole executive agreements - to subjects within his independent powers
- have rendered their use non-coextensive with that of the congressional-executive
agreement.").
"4 For an articulation of the President's duties, see U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3.
' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 303 cmt. e (noting that the "prevailing
view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty
method in every instance.").
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may well be wider than the permissible range of the former. 6 The treaty power is
an enumerated power, 7 the use of which requires approval by two-thirds of the
Senate rather than by a simple majority in both houses. If Congress, rather than the
Senate, is to be the body giving its imprimatur to an agreement at hand, it must do
so pursuant to a different power,'" for example, regulating commerce with foreign
nations,'9 defining and punishing violations of international law,20 or, perhaps,
passing laws to enable the federal government to execute those powers given it by
the Constitution.2'
The claim here is not that the Constitution requires the Court to distinguish
between treaties and congressional-executive agreements22 - there is room within
the existing treaty jurisprudence for the Court to say that the President's foreign
affairs power is plenary23 so that the President, perhaps in conjunction with
Congress,24 could completely subvert state law as long as this was done pursuant to
6 See Yoo, supra note 11, at 762 (offering a "clear dividing line that demarcates the
situations in which treaties must be the sole instrument of national policy, and those that can
be dealt with by the congressional-executive agreement"); Note, Restructuring the Modem
Treaty Power, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2478, 2479-80 (2001) ("[T]he collapse of the domestic-
international distinction has created new federalism concerns that should be addressed by
applying the Court's recent state sovereignty decisions to congressional-executive
agreements, but not to formal treaties."); cf. Spiro, supra note 11, at 1001 (pointing out that
some argue that those international agreements implicating core state-level authority should
require Senate ratification).
'7 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 2.
,s See Yoo, supra note 11, at 764 (arguing that the "normal statutory mode must [only]
be used to approve international agreements that regulate matters within Congress's Article
I powers"); see generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
'9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
21 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
22 The Constitution nowhere mentions congressional-executive agreements. See Spiro,
supra note 11, at 962 (noting that congressional-executive agreements are not mentioned in
the Constitution).
23 Cf Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 445 (1998) ("[Tlhis Court has
recognized that in the foreign affairs arena, the President has 'a degree of discretion and
freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved."' (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)));
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 741 (1971) ("[I]t is beyond cavil that the
President has broad powers by virtue of his primary responsibility for the conduct of our
foreign affairs and his position as Commander in Chief."); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763, 789 (1950) (discussing the "conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs, for which the
President is exclusively responsible"); Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) (describing the President as "the Nation's organ in foreign
affairs").
24 See Itel Containers Intern. Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 85 (1993) ("The
constitutional power over foreign affairs is shared by Congress and the President."); Regan
2003]
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an agreement with another nation. However, it is extremely unlikely that the Court
would so hold. What is much more likely is that the Court would (1) construe the
foreign affairs powers of both the President and the Congress as limited in some
way, and (2) suggest that an international agreement ratified by two-thirds of the
Senate might cover some things that could not otherwise be covered. The
justifications for the latter position would be that (a) no language in the Constitution
is superfluous and the requirement for super-majority Senate ratification would be
superfluous were there no difference between congressional-executive agreements
and treaties,25 and (b) failing to distinguish between approval by majority vote in
both houses of Congress and approval by two-thirds of the Senate would not take
into account the structure of the Constitution.26 Thus, it is suggested here that were
an appropriate opportunity to arise, the Court might well modify the existing treaty
jurisprudence by (1) distinguishing among international agreements with respect to
the permissible contents of each, and (2) limiting the reach of the most potentially
far-ranging kind of international agreement - a treaty ratified by two-thirds of the
Senate.
B. Construing Treaties
Suppose that a treaty has been signed by the President and ratified by the
Senate. Such a treaty will have to be interpreted. When construing treaties, courts
have adopted certain rules of thumb. In Nielsen v. Johnson,27 the Court suggested
that treaties "are to be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of
the parties." 2 The Court explained: "When a treaty provision fairly admits of two
v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 262 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("It is the responsibility of the
President and Congress to determine the course of the Nation's foreign affairs."); Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (discussing "the field of foreign affairs which the
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress"); United States v. Minnesota, 270
U.S. 181, 201 (1926) ("Under the Constitution the treaty-making power resides in the
President and Senate, and when through their action a treaty is made and proclaimed it
becomes a law of the United States.").
25 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be presumed
that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such
construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.").
26 See Yoo, supra note 11, at 822 (suggesting that distinguishing in this way would better
account for the structure of the Constitution).
27 279 U.S. 47 (1929).
2 Id. at 51 (citing Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928)); see also Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) ("It is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties
that they shall be liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent intention of the parties
to secure equality and reciprocity between them."); Hauenstein v. Lynharn, 100 U.S. 483,
487 (1879) ("Where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to the rights, that
may be claimed under it, and the other liberal, the latter is to be preferred.").
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constructions, one restricting, the other enlarging rights which may be claimed
under it, the more liberal interpretation is to be preferred."29 This is true even if the
more liberal construction would conflict with state law, whereas the narrower
construction would not.3° Further, where there is such a conflict, the treaty
provisions, rather than state law, must be respected.3'
In order for a treaty to displace state or federal law, it must be in effect. A
treaty will not be in effect if it is non-self-executing and the necessary implementing
legislation has not yet been passed. 2 An international agreement will be treated as
non-self-executing and thus not displacing state or federal law "(a) if the agreement
manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the
enactment of implementing legislation, (b) if the Senate in giving consent to a
treaty, or Congress by resolution, requires implementing legislation, or (c) if
implementing legislation is constitutionally required."33 Thus, the treaty (a) might
itself not be intended to be self-executing, or (b) the Senate might only be willing
to ratify it if it is non-self-executing, or (c) regardless of the intent of the treaty
framers or the Senate members, the Constitution might preclude it from being
ratified as a self-executing document.
The California Supreme Court explained how to determine whether a treaty was
intended to be self-executing: First, "courts look to the intent of the signatory
parties as manifested by the language of the instrument."34 Where the language is
not dispositive, the courts can consider "the circumstances surrounding [the
treaty's] execution."3 The California court explained, "In order for a treaty
29 Nielsen, 279 U.S. at 52 (citing Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924)).
31 See id. ("[A]nd as the treaty-making power is independent of and superior to the
legislative power of the states, the meaning of treaty provisions so construed is not restricted
by any necessity of avoiding possible conflict with state legislation and when so ascertained
must prevail over inconsistent state enactments.").
31 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942) ("But state law must yield
when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty or of an
international compact or agreement." (citing Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929)));
Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), overruled in part by Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
[A] law of Congress regulating commerce with foreign nations, or among the
several States, is the supreme law; and if the law of a State is in conflict with it,
the law of Congress must prevail, and the State law cease to operate so far as it
is repugnant to the law of the United States.
Id. at 574.
32 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 111(3).
I3 d. § 111(4).
Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1952).
31 Id.; see also Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
Because a treaty ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land, see
U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, but also an agreement among sovereign powers, we
have traditionally considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and
2003]
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provision to be operative without the aid of implementing legislation and to have
the force and effect of a statute, it must appear that the framers of the treaty
intended to prescribe a rule that, standing alone, would be enforceable in the
courts. '36 If the framers themselves did not intend the treaty to have the force of
law even after ratification, then the ratified treaty will require further implementing
legislation to have that effect.
A treaty that is not intended to be self-executing and enforceable in the courts
absent further legislative action may nonetheless serve useful functions. 37 For
example, the treaty may be aspirational. 3' Thus, it may set goals towards which
countries will aim, even if the failure to reach such goals would not constitute a
treaty violation.
Many treaties are not intended in and of themselves to impose a new legal
standard. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Chae Chan Ping v.
United States,39 a treaty "is often merely promissory in its character, requiring
legislation to carry its stipulations into effect."'  The Court made the same point
in Prigg v. Pennsylvania:41 "Treaties made between the United States and foreign
powers often contain special provisions, which do not execute themselves, but
require the interposition of Congress to carry them into effect."'42 Assuming that a
non-self-executing treaty has been made in accord with the requirements of the
Constitution, Congress can pass the necessary implementing legislation pursuant to
the Necessary and Proper Clause to make the treaty have the force of law.43
drafting history (travaux preparatoires) and the postratification understanding
of the contracting parties.
Id. at 226.
36 Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 620.
" See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J.
1935 (2002).
When a country ratifies a treaty, it may do so for purely disingenuous reasons
(simply to gain the expressive benefit), for aspirational reasons (because the
government or a part thereof is truly committed to the norms embodied in the
treaty and wishes to commit the country thereto), or for self-interested reasons
(perhaps because political or economic benefits are tied to ratification).
Id. at 2022.
38 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 773, 805 (2002) ("International agreements and treaties often have an aspirational
(rather than rule-making) quality.").
39 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
40 Id. at 600; see also Yoo, supra note 11, at 797 (describing "the view that most treaties
are non-self-executing; in other words, that they do not exert a domestic legal effect unless
Congress implements their terms by statute .....
41 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
42 Id. at 619.
43 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
The power of Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
[Vol. 12:179
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Whether a treaty is merely promissory or, instead, self-executing can have
important implications. Consider a statute which "in the absence of treaty,
withholds all interests in real property from aliens who are ineligible to citizenship
under federal naturalization laws."" In Sei Fujii v. State,45 a California appellate
court examined such a statute and held that it was void because it was in conflict
with the Charter of the United Nations,46 which had been ratified by the United
States." The California Supreme Court affirmed that the statute was invalid, but
based its decision on other grounds.4" The California high court pointed out that the
provisions of the Charter were not self-executing, 9 and thus did not impose any
legal obligations." Because the Charter imposed no obligations, it could neither be
execution as well the powers enumerated in Section 8 of article I of the
Constitution, as all others vested in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or the officers thereof, includes the power to enact such
legislation as is appropriate to give efficacy to any stipulations which it is
competent for the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to
insert in a treaty with a foreign power.
Id. at 121; see also Golove, supra note 3, at 1311 ("[T]here has never been any question but
that Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement any
(constitutional) treaty made by the President and Senate."); Gerald L. Neuman, The Global
Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 49 (1997) ("The Necessary and Proper
Clause empowers Congress to enact legislation implementing a valid international treaty, just
as it may implement other federal powers.").
44 Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 624 (Cal. 1952); see also Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 636 (1948) ("In broad outline, the Alien Land Law forbids aliens ineligible for
American citizenship to acquire, own, occupy, lease, or transfer agricultural land.").
4' 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. App. 1950), vacated by 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
4 A perusal of the Charter renders it manifest that restrictions contained in the
Alien Land Law are in direct conflict with the plain terms of the Charter above
quoted and with the purposes announced therein by its framers. It is
incompatible with Article 17 of the Declaration of Human Rights which
proclaims the right of everyone to own property .... The Alien Land Laws must
therefore yield to the treaty as the superior authority.
Id. at 488; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399,411 (2000) (discussing the concern "that the
U.N. Charter would preempt state laws by virtue of the Supremacy Clause").
47 See Sei Fujii, 217 P.2d at 486.
4' See Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 630 ("[W]e hold that the alien land law is invalid as in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
41 Id. at 620 ("[T]he provisions of the preamble and of Article I of the charter which are
claimed to be in conflict with the alien land law are not self-executing."); see also Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 313-14 (1829) ("A treaty... does not generally effect, of itself, the
object to be accomplished; especially, so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried
into execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument.") overruled
in part by U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
" Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 620-21 ("[T]he provisions ... do not purport to impose legal
obligations on the individual member nations or to create rights in private persons.").
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said that the Charter provisions had become the supreme law of the land nor that the
state law had been rendered invalid on supremacy grounds."1 Instead, the court
struck down the statute as a violation of federal constitutional guarantees.52 By so
holding, the California court was able to strike down an invidiously motivated
statute, which both deprived individuals of important rights and was likely a source
of continuing international embarrassment,53 but at the same time did not subject
state laws to the requirements of the Charter, which are arguably more demanding
than the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Ratification and RUDs
A non-self-executing treaty becomes effective when implementing legislation
has been passed.54 However, when passing implementing legislation, Congress can
articulate reservations,55 understandings,56 and declarations57 (RUDs) to limit the
force of the treaty.58 By the same token, the Senate, when ratifying a treaty, can
"' See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
52 Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 630 ("[W]e hold that the alien land law is invalid as in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
13 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,672 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe Alien
Land Law from its inception has proved an embarrassment to the United States
Government.").
54 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 111(3) ("[A] 'non-self-executing'
agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation.").
" Only certain reservations will be permitted. See id. § 313(1) ("A state may enter a
reservation to a multilateral international agreement unless: (a) reservations are prohibited
by the agreement, (b) the agreement provides that only specified reservations not including
the reservation in question may be made, or (c) the reservation is incompatible with the
object and purpose of the agreement.").
56 See id. § 314(2) ("When the Senate gives its advice and consent to a treaty on the basis
of a particular understanding of its meaning, the President, if he makes the treaty, must do
so on the basis of the Senate's understanding.").
51 See id. § 313 cmt. g:
When signing or adhering to an international agreement, a state may make a
unilateral declaration that does not purport to be a reservation. Whatever it is
called, it constitutes a reservation in fact if it purports to exclude, limit, or
modify the state's legal obligation. Sometimes, however, a declaration purports
to be an "understanding," an interpretation of the agreement in a particular
respect. Such an interpretive declaration is not a reservation if it reflects the
accepted view of the agreement.
s See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 46, at 400-01 ("Beginning in the 1970s, the
treatymakers ... ratiflied] the treaties with a set of conditions. These conditions take the form
of reservations, understandings, and declarations - collectively, 'RUDs' - to U.S.
ratification.").
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enter RUDs and, in fact, there is a current trend to do so when ratifying human
rights treaties.59
The trend to enter RUDs is traced back to the 1950s when Ohio Senator Bricker
proposed various amendments to Article VI.6" These amendments would have
limited the contents of the treaties that might be signed,61 prevented treaties from
being self-executing,62 or would have denied supremacy to treaties over federal or
state law,63 thereby, for example, preventing human rights treaties from forcing
states to end segregation.' Some commentators suggest that Senator Bricker' s goal
of limiting the force of treaties has been realized as a matter of fact, because the
United States frequently only signs treaties after entering RUDs to undercut the
force of the treaty being ratified.65
" See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995) ("[T]he United States has attached to each of
its [human rights convention] ratifications a 'package' of reservations, understandings and
declarations (RUDs)") (editorial comments).
6 Bradley, supra note 8, at 426-27.
61 There were numerous versions of the 'Bricker Amendment,' one of which
provided that "[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United
States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of a treaty."
Id.
62 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 46, at 412-13 ("In general, the proposed
amendments were intended to preclude treaties from being self-executing and to make clear
that treaties would not override the reserved powers of the states. Some versions also would
have restricted the use of executive agreements.").
63 See Paul, supra note 10, at 703 ('The Bricker Amendment, which took various forms
during the early 1950s, would have amended Article VI of the Constitution to deny the
supremacy of treaties or executive agreements over state or federal law.").
' See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 12, at 898 ("Brickerites sought an explicit
amendment overruling this decision, warning their colleagues that liberals might otherwise
override racially discriminatory state laws by ratifying human rights treaties."); Henkin,
supra note 59, at 348 ("The campaign for the Bricker Amendment apparently represented a
move by anti-civil-rights and 'states' rights' forces to seek to prevent - in particular -
bringing an end to racial discrimination and segregation by international treaty.").
65 See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-
Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 515, 516 (1991)
("[T]he non-self-executing declaration and others of its ilk could undermine the efficacy of
the treaties to which they apply, both within the United States and in terms of the potential
for the United States to exercise constructive influence abroad."); Henkin, supra note 59, at
341:
As a result of... [its RUDs], U.S. ratification has been described as specious,
meretricious, hypocritical. Many U.S. supporters of ratification are of the view
that elements in the package of RUDs distort the treaty-making process under the
United States Constitution, in ways that echo the "Bricker Amendment," thought
dead and buried forty years ago.
See also Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111
YALE L.J. 619, 665 (2001) ("Although the Bricker Amendment did not become law, some
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Suppose, however, that the United States Senate ratified a human rights treaty
without entering RUDs. Suppose further that the treaty was self-executing and, if
valid, would modify state law in areas traditionally reserved for the states. At least
one question would be whether the federal government would have had the power
to enter into such an agreement. After all, no treaty will be valid if it violates
constitutional guarantees.6 6 If the Constitution precludes treaties that impermissibly
regulate matters which are reserved for the states, then such treaties will be held
void and of no legal effect.67 As the Court explained in Reid v. Covert,68 "no
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution. 6 9
In United States v. Pink,7 the Court made clear that "treaties with foreign
nations will be carefully construed so as not to derogate from the authority and
jurisdiction of the States of this nation unless clearly necessary to effectuate the
national policy,"7 1 thus suggesting a constitutional preference not to infringe on the
sovereignty of the States. Of course, as the Pink Court made known, where national
policy is clearly implicated and the intent to supplant state law is clear, the
believe it has become fact - through practices of the Senate that consistently limit the
application of international laws by reference to federalism.").
66 See The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1870) ("It need hardly
be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that
instrument."); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1854) ("The treaty is therefore
a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or
disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States.");
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 115(3) ("A rule of international law or a
provision of an international agreement of the United States will not be given effect as law
in the United States if it is inconsistent with the United States Constitution.").
67 See Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 588 (1847) ("The federal
government is supreme in the exercise of powers delegated to it, but beyond this its acts are
unconstitutional and void.") overruled in part by Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890);
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 507 (1849) (Daniel, J., dissenting):
Laws of the United States, in order to be binding, must be within the legitimate
powers vested by the Constitution. Treaties, in order to be valid, must be made
within the scope of the same powers; for there can be no authority of the United
States, save what is derived mediately or immediately, and regularly and
legitimately, from the Constitution. A treaty no more than an ordinary statute can
arbitrarily cede away any one right of a State, or of any citizen of a State.
Id. (citing Doe ex dem Stark v. Gildart, 6 Miss. 606, 5 How. 606, 613 (1841)).
68 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
69 Id. at 16; see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)
(explaining that the power to make treaties is restricted "by the Constitution itself and
considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all
civilized nations").
70 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
"' Id. at 230 (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938)).
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provisions of a valid treaty must be given effect." Yet, the question at issue here
is whether the hypothetical human rights treaty described above would in fact be
valid,7 3 and thus whether state or federal law would in fact have been supplanted.
D. Missouri v. Holland
Traditionally, scholars cite Missouri v. Holland to establish that treaties may
address any subject." Commentators seem to suggest that were the Court to
overrule Holland, the treaty power might then be delimited, but that the federal
government's power to circumvent federalism restrictions pursuant to the treaty
power is safe as long as Holland remains good law." Yet, it is not at all clear that
72 See id. at 230-31 ("[Sltate law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the
policy or provisions of, a treaty or of an international compact or agreement.").
" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 302(2) ("No provision of an agreement
may contravene any of the prohibitions or limitations of the Constitution applicable to the
exercise of authority by the United States."); see also The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616,
620-21 (1870) ("[A] treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in
violation of that instrument."); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 507 (1849) (Daniel,
J., dissenting):
Laws of the United States, in order to be binding, must be within the legitimate
powers vested by the Constitution. Treaties, in order to be valid, must be made
within the scope of the same powers; for there can be no authority of the United
States, save what is derived mediately or immediately, and regularly and
legitimately, from the Constitution.
Id.
14 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that in pursuance of a valid treaty, the government could
act under authority of the Constitution, Article VI).
s Damrosch, supra note 65, at 530:
By virtue of... the authoritative decision of the Supreme Court in Missouri v.
Holland... our constitutional law is clear: the treaty-makers may make supreme
law binding on the states as to any subject, and notions of states' rights should
not be asserted as impediments to the full implementation of treaty obligations.
But see Ann Althouse, A Response to Professor Woolhandler's "Treaties, Self-Execution,
and the Public Law Litigation Model", 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 789, 792 (2002) ("Missouri v.
Holland is an enigma that permits its readers to see what they would like to see. It strikes me
as wishful thinking to conclude that ideas about federalism play no role in interpreting the
scope of the treaty power.").
76 See Spiro, supra note 11, at 1005 (suggesting that federalism restrictions might no
longer be circumvented were Holland overruled); Robert Knowles, Note, Starbucks and the
New Federalism, The Court's Answer to Globalization, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 735, 777 (2001)
("If Missouri v. Holland remains good law, very little can prevent a torrent of international
standards from wiping out state prerogatives."); cf. Yoo, supra note 11, at 827 (discussing
"Holland's expansive language [which] ... seems to assert without any textual basis that the
federal government can act outside of its enumerated powers ... ").
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Holland must be read so broadly, and extremely unlikely that the current Court
would so construe it.
At issue in Holland was a treaty with Great Britain" protecting migratory
birds.78 Congress had previously attempted to pass legislation to effect that same
end, but that legislation had been struck down by two lower courts.79 Thus, in
United States v. Shauver, ° a federal district court in Arkansas considered whether
Congress had the power to pass migratory bird legislation." Although willing to
grant that "only by national legislation can migratory wild game and fish be
preserved to the people, '82 the court was not persuaded that Congress therefore had
the power to pass the protective legislation. The court concluded that Congress did
not have that power,83 and that a constitutional amendment would be required to
afford Congress that power.84 By the same token, in United States v. McCullagh,85
a federal district court in Kansas denied that Congress could regulate migratory
birds by invoking its commerce power. 6 The court understood that the act might
be quite beneficial, but cautioned:
[N]o matter how laudable the purpose of Congress in the passage of the
act in question may have been, or how great the ultimate end sought
thereby to be attained for the common good, such end does not justify
the means employed, if it be found on examination to lie beyond
constitutional bounds.87
The McCullagh court concluded that Congress had exceeded constitutional bounds
when passing the statute that protected the migratory birds. 8
To illustrate that Congress may be precluded from passing even beneficial
legislation, the McCullagh court noted that there could be "no doubt but that a
7 See Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
78 See id.
7 See id. at 432 (citing United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914) and United
States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915)).
80 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
81 See id. at 156.
82 Id. at 160.
83 See id. ("The court is unable to find any provision in the Constitution authorizing
Congress, either expressly or by necessary implication, to protect or regulate the shooting of
migratory wild game when in a state, and is therefore forced to the conclusion that the act is
unconstitutional.").
' See id.; see also McCullagh, 221 F. at 291 ("[Tlhe only proper course lies in
amendment of the Constitution.").
85 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915).
86 See id. at 292.
87 Id. at 290-91.
88 Id. at 296.
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uniform system of laws on the subjects of marriage and divorce in this country
would terminate many serious evils and accomplish inestimable good." 9 Were
Congress to have the power to pass such laws, "a few comparatively simple
provisions would accomplish this much desired result."90 However, the court
suggested, it was so clear that this was not within congressional power that it had
never even been attempted, much less accomplished.9
Refusing to address the substantive merits of McCullagh and Shauver, the
Holland Court instead suggested that whether those cases "were decided rightly or
not they cannot be accepted as a test of the treaty power."92 Writing for the Court,
Justice Holmes suggested that "there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for
the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty
followed by such an act could,"93 making it clear that Congress could regulate some
areas in pursuance of a treaty that it could not otherwise permissibly regulate.
The Holland Court cited Andrews v. Andrews94 with approval. 95 At issue in
Andrews was whether a divorce granted in South Dakota had to be accorded full
faith and credit by Massachusetts when the divorce had allegedly been secured by
a Massachusetts domiciliary falsely claiming to be domiciled in South Dakota.96
Recognizing that "the Constitution of the United States confers no power whatever
upon the government of the United States to regulate marriage in the States, or its
dissolution,"97 the Andrews Court worried that a limitation on the power of
Massachusetts to decide whether or not to recognize the divorce would have dire
results.98 The Court noted that it would be disastrous were it to "come to pass that
the governments, state and Federal, are bereft by the operation of the Constitution
of the United States of a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in
every civilized government,"99 apparently believing that forcing Massachusetts to
recognize the decree would somehow deprive it of the power to make decisions
89 Id. at 291.
9 Id.
9' See id.
92 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
93 Id.; see also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 1317, 1342 (1999) ('The fact is that the power to make treaties is not just the
power to make laws on the same subjects by other means; it is the power to make laws on
subjects not otherwise falling within Congress's legislative power.").
94 188 U.S. 14 (1903), overruled by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
9' See Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
96 See Andrews, 188 U.S. at 37-38.
9' Id. at 32.
98 The Court rejected that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required Massachusetts to
recognize the South Dakota decree, arguing that such a claim "must rest on the assumption
that the Constitution has destroyed those rights of local self-government which it was its
purpose to preserve." Id. at 33.
9' Id. at 32-33.
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regarding the validity of marriages. Because the federal government clearly did not
have the power to regulate marriage and divorce," ° depriving the state of that power
would allegedly mean that no government would have the power to regulate marital
relations. Yet, such a result would be absurd, since the power at issue is a
paradigmatic governmental function.'0 '
The point here is not to claim that Andrews is still good law,0 2 since the Court
has subsequently made clear that divorce decrees granted in one state are entitled
to full faith and credit in all of the states absent fraud or lack of jurisdiction. 1°
Rather, the point here is that Andrews suggests that the state has certain powers, the
federal government has other powers, and that a power inherent in the notion of
government must be possessed by one or the other, if not both. Yet, to say that a
particular power is inherent in the nature of government does not address which
government must possess it, especially in a system that incorporates dual
sovereignty. It is thus unclear whether the Holland Court- which cited Andrews
with approval" and which made clear that the treaty power was not limited to those
powers contained in Article 105 - really thought the treaty power plenary so that,
for example, the federal government could make an international agreement and
thereby supplant state marriage laws involving citizens of those very states. '06
'o See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
,o, The Court seemed to believe that Massachusetts would have been deprived of the
power to regulate marriage if it could be forced to recognize a foreign decree awarding a
Massachusetts domiciliary a divorce. See Andrews, 188 U.S. at 32.
102 Andrews was overruled by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
103 See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942).
[W]hen a court of one state acting in accord with the requirements of procedural
due process alters the marital status of one domiciled in that state by granting
him a divorce from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree should be
excepted from the full faith and credit clause merely because its enforcement or
recognition in another state would conflict with the policy of the latter.
'o See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
0 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
10 A separate issue would be raised were there an international agreement to cover the
marriages of citizens of other countries. See Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931)
("The treaty-making power is broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our
foreign relations, and agreement with respect to the rights and privileges of citizens of the
United States in foreign countries, and of the nationals of such countries within the United
States."); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875):
The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of
foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States. It has
the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the
character of those regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs
solely to the national government.
Id.; Ann Woolhandler, Treaties, Self-Execution, and the Public Law Litigation Model, 42
VA. J. INT'LL. 757, 778 (2002) ("The nineteenth-century cases... demonstrate a willingness
to provide aliens with rights comparable to those that the courts were willing to enforce for
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Andrews made very clear that regulation of marriage and divorce was a state, rather
than a federal, matter and there is absolutely no indication in Holland that the Court
had changed its view on that point. Indeed, the Holland Court suggested, "What
was said in [Andrews] with regard to the powers of the States applies with equal
force to the powers of the nation in cases where the States individually are
incompetent to act,"'O' thus leaving open the possibility that the federal government
would sometimes not have the power to act where the state was competent to act.
Recognizing that "the great body of private relations usually fall within the
control of the State,"°" the Holland Court then noted that "a treaty may override its
[the state's] power."l" The Court thereby reaffirmed that some, but not necessarily
all, matters normally left to the states will permissibly be subjects of treaties. Yet,
the Holland Court also made clear that there are some limitations on the treaty
power, since a treaty must "not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the
Constitution.""'  While such a limitation does not cabin the treaty power very
much,"' it would prevent a treaty from limiting First Amendment protections' 2 and
might prevent a treaty from encroaching on other areas as well. Thus,
commentators' claims to the contrary notwithstanding," 3 the Court seems to have
lots of room for limiting (or, perhaps, recharacterizing) the treaty power even
without overruling Holland."4
Those construing Holland broadly point to the Court's refusal to find that the
migratory bird treaty at issue was "forbidden by some invisible radiation from the
domestic litigants."); cf. Vazquez, supra note 93, at 1338:
[I]t is clear that the treatment of aliens has long been regarded as an appropriate
subject of negotiation between the United States and the countries of which the
aliens are nationals. Treaties giving aliens certain rights date back to the
beginning of our history and have long been applied to the states.
101 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
o Id. at 434.
109 Id.
"0 Id. at 433.
"' See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign
Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 70 (1999) ("Direct prohibitions on the conduct of the federal
government are few and far between in the constitutional text.").
12 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (holding that the First Amendment
trumped the dignity interest of foreign officials).
13 See Henkin, supra note 59, at 345 ("There are no significant 'states' rights' limitations
on the treaty power."); Neuman, supra note 43, at 46-47 (reading Holland as establishing
that the treaty power is plenary); Vazquez, supra note 93, at 1343 ("[U]nless Missouri v.
Holland is reconsidered, it appears that there are no limits on the treaty power grounded in
state sovereignty.").
"4 But see Neuman, supra note 43, at 47-48 ("The Supreme Court's reinvigoration of the
inherent limits of the Commerce Clause in Lopez is unlikely to foreshadow so radical a
change .... The present Court shows no evidence of any intent to hamstring the international
relations of the United States in this manner.").
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general terms of the Tenth Amendment."' 15 Yet, there, the Court was not talking
about whether the treaty-making power as a general matter was constrained by
Tenth Amendment radiations, but only whether that particular treaty was so
constrained. It is thus too strong to claim that Holland held that the Tenth
Amendment does not constrain the treaty power.
At least two issues are raised by Holland: (1) does the treaty power give the
federal government as a whole the power to regulate in areas in which it otherwise
could not; and (2) if so, what are the limitations on that additional power?" 6
Consider Justice Holmes's point that "there may be matters of the sharpest exigency
for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a
treaty followed by such an act could.""..7 Justice Holmes might merely have been
offering the kind of analysis offered by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 1 8 namely, that the treaty power would include all things that
are appropriately subject to either presidential or congressional power,' 19 whereas
Congress can only enact legislation pursuant to its own powers. On this
understanding, Holland would not be expanding the treaty power beyond what is
otherwise reserved for the federal government, 2 ° even if it is going beyond what it
"5 Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. See Neuman, supra note 43, at 46 ("The reach of the
separately enumerated treaty power to matters ordinarily of local concern, free from any
'invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment,' was settled in Missouri
v. Holland."); Vazquez, supra note 93, at 1337-38 ("But the Court's holding in Missouri v.
Holland that the treaty power is not limited by any 'invisible radiation' from the Tenth
Amendment has survived."); Yoo, supra note 11, at 850 (discussing Holland's grant of
broader powers to impose obligations free from the "invisible radiations" of the Tenth
Amendment).
16 See Golove, supra note 3, at 1087-88 (discussing differing views of the treaty power).
117 Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
118 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
119 See id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion of the Court) ("When
the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority
is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate."); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981) ("When
the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from Congress, he
exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by Congress.").
"2' Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1942) ("Power over external affairs
is ... vested in the national government exclusively .... And the policies of the States
become wholly irrelevant to judicial inquiry when the United States, acting within its
constitutional sphere, seeks enforcement of its foreign policy in the courts.") (emphasis
added).
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reserved for Congress.' Thus, it is possible to read Holland as much less
expansive than most commentators would claim.
The Holland Court pointed out that "[aicts of Congress are the supreme law of
the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are
declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States."' 22 The
question then becomes, when is a treaty made under the authority of the United
States? The answer to that question might be: (1) as long as the correct procedural
rules are followed, or (2) as long as the treaty deals with particular subjects, or (3)
as long as the treaty reaches matters appropriately regulated by the United States
(that is, the federal government as a whole) rather than, for example, only those
appropriately regulated by Congress. 123  Doubtless, there are other possible
interpretations as well. 24 The Holland Court understood that the opinion left this
matter unresolved but refused to address it, instead merely pointing out that "[it is
open to question whether the authority of the United States means more than the
formal acts prescribed to make the convention." 125 Thus, Holland could be read as
suggesting that the treaty power: (1) is plenary, (2) permits the federal government
as a whole to regulate areas that it could not otherwise regulate,' 26 or (3) permits
Congress to regulate more than it could under Article I, but does not permit the
federal government to regulate anything that it could not otherwise regulate. ,
27
121 Some commentators do not seem to appreciate the difference between the treaty power
expanding the federal power more generally and expanding Congress's power in particular.
See Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in
Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1277, 1279 (1999) (reading Holland as declaring "that
the federal government could take action in the name of the treaty power that it might not be
able to undertake through its domestic authority").
122 Holland, 252 U.S. at 433; see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,600
(1889) ("By the Constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof and treaties made under the
authority of the United States are both declared to be the supreme law of the land.").
123 (2) and (3) need not be coextensive, since (3) may be determined by considering
whether the government is acting in light of an enumerated power, rather than the subject
matter of a particular treaty.
124 For example, it might be argued that the "authority of the United States," stated in
Holland is suggesting that the implementation of treaties requires congressional, rather than
mere Senate, approval. But see Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) ("Our constitution
declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of
justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid
of any legislative provision.").
125 Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
'26 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, Revisited, 99 COLUM.
L. REv. 1630, 1645 (1999) ("Missouri v. Holland stands for the basic proposition that the
Treaty Clause of Article H confers a substantive enumerated power of the federal
government.").
127 See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
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Even if Holland need not be construed as establishing that the treaty power is
plenary, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. ' has been so interpreted.
29
Writing for the Court in Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland distinguished between
the government's powers over foreign and domestic affairs,130 explaining that those
powers differed both with respect to their nature and their sources. 3 ' Justice
Sutherland argued that a narrow construction of the federal powers was appropriate
with respect to domestic affairs because those powers otherwise belonged to the
states. 3 However, he reasoned, because "the states severally never possessed
international powers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of
state powers;"' 33 thus, with respect to foreign affairs, there was no need to worry
128 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
129 See Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 1127, 1131 (1999) ("Justice Sutherland's majority opinion in Curtiss-Wright
represents the apex of the doctrine of plenary executive power over foreign affairs.");
Golove, supra note 3, at 1088-89 n.36 (suggesting that the Curtiss-Wright "view strongly
implies that the treaty power is plenary and is not subject to 'reserved' powers limitations of
any kind"); Note, supra note 16, at 2499 (stating that the Curtiss-Wright view "militates
against imposing federalism limitations on either form of international agreement"); Michael
D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 379, 379 (2000) ("Curtiss-Wright is a striking departure from the usual view of
constitutional law, which holds that the federal government is one of enumerated powers");
cf. Knowles, supra note 76.
[T]here are obstacles to translating the holding of Lopez from the commerce
power to the treaty power. First, the treaty power may not be a delegated power
at all but, rather, a power reserved to the federal government. In United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., Justice Sutherland wrote that the treaty power
was never an enumerated power because it never belonged to the states.
Id. at 767; Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still GoodLaw? Federalism and the
Treaty Power, 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 1726, 1742 (1998) (stating that in Curtiss-Wright, "the
Court declared that foreign affairs powers are not 'enumerated powers' and are therefore not
denied to the federal government if not enumerated").
'30 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315:
It will contribute to the elucidation of the question if we first consider the
differences between the powers of the federal government in respect of foreign
or external affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal affairs. That there
are differences between them, and that these differences are fundamental, may
not be doubted.
I3' d. ("The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of their origin and their
nature.").
132 Id. at 316 (stating that internal affairs, "the primary purpose of the Constitution was to
carve from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the states such portions
as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal government, leaving those not included in
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about whether the federal government would be encroaching upon an area that had
been reserved for the states.
Justice Sutherland suggested that "the investment of the federal government
with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants
of the Constitution,"' since they "obviously were transmitted to the United States
from some other source."' 35 For purposes here, Justice Sutherland's claim about the
source of those powers need not be discussed.'36 Rather, what is important is that
the Curtiss-Wright Court was careful to explain what those foreign affairs powers
were - the "powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties,
to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties."'37 These are the powers
which, even "if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have
vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.' 13
Indeed, when discussing "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations,"131 the Curtiss- Wright Court pointed out that this power, "like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable
provisions of the Constitution."' 4
Justice Sutherland's Curtiss-Wright opinion is more easily understood if one
also considers another opinion that he authored that same year, Carter v. Carter
Coal Co. "' In Carter Coal, Justice Sutherland explained that the "powers which
the general government may exercise are only those specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into
effect the enumerated powers."'142 He noted that states having differing laws in a
variety of areas had "resulted in injurious confusion and embarrassment,"' 143 and
specifically mentioned that "state laws with respect to marriage and divorce present
a case in point." '44 While noting that the Commission on Uniform State Laws had
had some success in bringing about uniformity among the states in this area of the
law, 4  Justice Sutherland realized that it would have been more efficient to achieve
3 Id. at 318.115 ld. at 316.
136 For the suggestion that neither the Court nor many commentators would endorse Justice
Sutherland's view, see Golove, supra note 3, at 1088-89 n.36.
117 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 320; see also Yoo, supra note 11, at 814 (suggesting that under Curtiss-Wright,
"the President is constitutionally responsible for the conduct of foreign policy").
'40 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
'' 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
142 Id. at 291.
t41 Id. at 292.
144 id.
141 Id. at 293.
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that same result in another way. However, he knew of no "easier and constitutional
way to these desirable results through congressional action."' 46 While Justice
Sutherland was not addressing foreign affairs powers in Carter Coal, the opinion
suggests that family law is one of those areas that falls within domestic affairs. As
Justice Sutherland made clear in Curtiss- Wright, federal powers regarding domestic
affairs are to be given a narrow construction. '47
While the Court has never specified the limitations on the treaty power, it has
often hinted that such limitations exist. For example, the Court in Geofroy v.
Riggs 48 discussed the treaty power restraints found in the Constitution itself and,
in addition, "those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the
states." In Holmes v. Jennison,149 Chief Justice Taney suggested that the possible
subjects of the treaty power had to be "consistent with the nature of our institutions,
and the distribution of powers between the general and state governments."
15 0
Indeed, even the Holland Court hinted that there might be federalism constraints on
the treaty power. When considering what limitations might be imposed on the
treaty power by the Tenth Amendment, Justice Holmes suggested that the Court
"must consider what this country has become in deciding what that amendment has
reserved.""'' However, consideration of what the country and its relation to the rest
of the world have become might lead to very different conclusions, depending upon
whether the growing interdependence of the world' is thought to militate in favor
of or against augmentation of federal power. Just as the Court in United States v.
Lopez"'53 rejected the" [g] overnment' s 'national productivity' reasoning"'54 because
under it "Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage,
divorce, and child custody) for example,"' 55 the Court might well reject that world
interdependence would permit the federal government to reach core state areas
under the theory that their regulation might have international implications.'56
146 id.
147 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
148 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
149 39 U.S. 540 (1840).
110 Id. at 569.
'' Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,434 (1920).
152 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(discussing "this interdependent world of ours," and the implications that this
interdependence has for congressional power).
13 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
154 Id. at 564.
155 Id.
156 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 426 (suggesting that even under Holland the Tenth
Amendment might not be irrelevant).
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The Lopez Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act because its
passage exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.'57 Starting
with "first principles,"' 58 such as that the "Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers,"'59 the Lopez Court suggested that the
"limitations on the commerce power are inherent in the very language of the
Commerce Clause. '' 16 The current Court would likely adopt an analogous tack in
the context under discussion here, demarcating the particular areas that are within
"foreign affairs,"'161 and offering the specific contours of the treaty power, fearing
that it would otherwise be "difficult to perceive any limitations on federal
power."
162
Perhaps the Court would follow the lead of the Holland Court and consider
whether the treaty involved "a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude" 163
or, perhaps, adopt some other method to determine which treaties might be made.
However, it simply is not credible to believe that the current Court would put no
limits on the treaty power.
In Lopez, the Court noted that:
[A] determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or
noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty. But, so
long as Congress' authority is limited to those powers enumerated in the
Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as
having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation
under the Commerce Clause always will engender "legal uncertainty." '6
157 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
'" Id. at 552.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 553 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824)).
161 Cf. id. at 558 (discussing "three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate
under its commerce power").
162 Id. at 564.
163 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,435 (1920); see also Michael 1. Gerhardt, Federal
Environmental Regulation in a Post-Lopez World: Some Questions andAnswers, 30 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10980, 11011 (2000) ("At least in some parts of the country, migratory birds are
unquestionably a resource shared by the United States and its neighboring countries. As such,
they constitute an appropriate subject of international treaties."); Bradford C. Mank,
Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on
Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA.
L. REv. 723, 774 (2002) ("In Missouri v. Holland, the Court upheld the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act as a necessary and proper means of executing Congress' Treaty Power. The Court
stated that the conservation of endangered wildlife was a 'national interest of very nearly the
first magnitude."').
164 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
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So, too, the Court would likely adopt some method, however legally uncertain,
for distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate uses of the treaty power.
While it will be difficult to draw a clear line specifying which subjects are
permissibly made the subjects of treaties and which are not because they are
reserved for the states, the Court has not permitted similar worries to prevent it from
limiting the power of the federal government.'65
In his Lopez concurrence, Justice Kennedy recognized that in a sense "any
conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or
consequence."' 66 Yet, the Court imposed clear limits on Congress's commerce
power,"' notwithstanding that everything is at least arguably linked to commerce.
This bodes poorly for the claim that the treaty power should be plenary, because
there is an important sense in which anything might affect international relations;
the Court might admit that interconnectedness but nonetheless deny that therefore
the treaty power is, or should be, plenary.
Were the current Court to decide whether the federal government has plenary
treaty power under the current treaty jurisprudence, the Court would likely read
Holland as suggesting that the Tenth Amendment offers (unspecified) substantive
constraints on the treaty power and Curtiss-Wright as recognizing a clear difference
between foreign and domestic powers'68 when describing the foreign powers as
plenary.'69 Of course, implicit in such an analysis is the assumption that the foreign
and domestic powers can be neatly distinguished, 7 ' which may simply be false.' 7'
165 See id. at 558-59.
"6 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167 See id. at 558-59:
Consistent with this structure, we have identified three broad categories of
activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.
[I ] Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.
[2] Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.
[3] Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
(citations omitted); cf. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 125 (1890) ("[T]here is difficulty in
drawing the line between the municipal powers of the one government [i.e., the state
government] and the commercial powers of the other [i.e., the congress].").
168 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321 (1936) (discussing
the "marked difference between foreign affairs and domestic affairs").
169 Cf. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) ("[T]reaty-making power is broad
enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations.").
170 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("Governmental power over
internal affairs is distributed between the national government and the several states.
Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the
national government."); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 605-06 (1889)
(discussing "[t]he control of local matters being left to local authorities, and national matters
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For example, it may not be possible to make a direct appeal to subject matter to
make the relevant distinction; as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has noted,
"the Constitution does not require that an international agreement deal only with
'matters of international concern. '" 72
Yet, even if there are no clear subject matter limits on the treaty power, that
does not mean that the power is plenary. To see what kind of limits might be placed
on the treaty power, it will be helpful to examine the Court's developing Commerce
Clause jurisprudence more closely.
H]. REGULATION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS AS PARADIGMATIC STATE POWER
Over the past several years, the Court has been narrowing Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause. 7 3 While not offering bright lines,'74 the Court has
being entrusted to the government of the Union."); Bradley, supra note 8, at 391 ("For much
of this century, American foreign affairs law has assumed that there is a sharp distinction
between what is foreign and what is domestic, between what is external and what is
internal."); Note, supra note 16.
The Framers vested the treaty power exclusively in the national government on
the rationale that in international as opposed to domestic affairs, the government
should be national rather than federal. As noted above, state sovereignty imposed
no limit on the breadth of the treaty power; rather, any limit came from the
definition of a "treaty." The Framers' fears that the treaty power would encroach
on state sovereignty were assuaged by their common understanding that treaties
were instruments of foreign as opposed to domestic affairs.
Id. at 2481-82. Justice Thomas seems to believe that matters of national concern can be
distinguished fairly readily from those of merely local concern. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 596
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he Constitution commits matters of 'national' concern to
Congress and leaves 'local' matters to the States.... The matters of national concern are
enumerated in the Constitution: war, taxes, patents, and copyrights, uniform rules of
naturalization and bankruptcy, types of commerce, and so on.").
1 See Bradley, supra note 8.
As [the] decision [in United States v. Lue] illustrates, the line between what is
domestic and what is international is difficult to define, the scope of what can
plausibly be labeled international has grown substantially in recent years, and
courts as a result are unlikely to restrict the treaty power much, if at all, based on
this distinction. If federalism is to be protected in the treaty context, another
approach must be found.
Id. at 455-56.
172 United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cit. 1998) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNItED STATES § 302 cmt. c (1986)); see also Yoo,
supra note 11, at 772 (noting that according to "standard internationalist thought," treaties
and congressional executive agreements "are not restricted by any subject matter
limitations").
173 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down a civil
provision in the Violence Against Women Act as beyond the commerce power); United
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made quite clear that Congress's power is more limited than might have been
thought from a cursory reading of Wickard v. Filburn."' Thus, it is simply no
longer true that Congress's power under the Commerce Clause is virtually
plenary,'76 and those seeking to determine whether there are limits on the Treaty
Clause may well have to take the limitations on the Commerce Clause into account.
A. Family Law as a State Concern
In several of the Court's recent decisions in which Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause has been narrowed, the Court suggested that domestic relations
law is paradigmatic of what has been left to the states. 7 7 On first blush, one might
think the Court is adopting what Professor Merritt has termed the "territorial model
of federalism."17 1 Professor Merritt explains:
This model recognizes that there is a discernible boundary between the
subjects fit for national regulation and those reserved for state
governance. Territorialists argue that the national government is supreme
in some areas, while states reign sovereign in others. Adherents of this
model, for example, might declare that the national government directs
foreign affairs while the states control domestic relations.' 79
Professor Merritt and others have rejected that the territorial model accounts for
contemporary federalism jurisprudence because Congress invokes its commerce or
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
as beyond the commerce power).
174 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
175 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (finding that Congress was authorized under its Commerce power
to impose wheat quotas). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (describing Wickard as "the most far
reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity").
176 Before Lopez, this analysis was generally accepted. See, e.g., Ackerman & Golove,
supra note 12, at 857 (discussing the "post-New Deal world in which the powers of Congress
are virtually plenary").
177 See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text; cf. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 71, 76 (1868) ("To [the states] nearly the whole charge of interior regulation is
committed or left; to them and to the people all powers not expressly delegated to the
national government are reserved.").
178 See Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the
Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1564 (1994).
179 Id. at 1564.
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spending powers"' ° to pass legislation that clearly affects the family.' Yet, the
issue remains for two distinct reasons:
1) The Court has been narrowing the range of matters which Congress may
regulate under the Commerce Clause and may well adopt the same stance
with respect to the Spending Clause when presented with such an
opportunity. Indeed, some commentators suggest that the Court's
federalism jurisprudence cannot be implemented unless the Court imposes
meaningful constraints on Congress's spending power."2
180 See Homer H. Clarke, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1
(1992).
Congress preempted an important segment of the law relating to children by
enacting, as part of the Social Security Act, extensive provisions governing the
establishment and enforcement of child support. States must comply with these
provisions in order to receive federal grants for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). By thus bypassing state sovereignty over a subject
traditionally within the province of the states, Congress has enacted what is
substantially a nationwide child support enforcement system.
Id. at 3; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y &
L. 541, 543 (1998) ("In taking on its new, broad role in child support matters, Congress has
exercised its 'spending power' primarily under Article I of the Constitution.").
181 See Merritt, supra note 178, at 1565 ("The territorial model of federalism is
problematic because it conflicts with modem concepts of Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause, Spending Clause, and other constitutional provisions."); see also Anne
C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787 (1995).
Over the last century, federalism had evolved from being a structural constraint
on the powers of the federal government to a pragmatic accommodation of the
interdependent relationship between the national and state governments. And as
the chains of state sovereignty fell away, family law had emerged in recent years
as an important arena of national interest, increasingly governed by national
legislation and increasingly presided over by federal courts. Indeed, prior to the
current Supreme Court term, one might easily have concluded that we were
witnessing the inevitable surrender of perhaps the last remaining substantive
legal area within the states' exclusive control.
Id. at 1788-89; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813,
824 (1998) ("Why permit the national government to preempt virtually all significant
regulatory fields, leaving the state governments with no significant jurisdiction remaining to
them, while strictly forbidding the national government from imposing even modest
regulatory responsibilities on state officials?"). But see Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,273 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("It is clear beyond
question that state sovereignty always has been a basic assumption of American political
theory. Although its contours have changed over two centuries, state sovereignty remains a
fundamental component of our system that this Court has recognized time and time again.").
182 See Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV.
195, 198 (2001) ("Congress's largely unfettered spending power undermines the
Constitution's protections for state autonomy."); Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating
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2) Those federal statutes affecting the family which the Court has upheld have
not been characterized as regulating marriage, divorce, and child custody.
A federal statute characterized as regulating these core areas might well not
be upheld.
An example of the tack discussed in (2) is provided in the analysis offered to
establish the constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA),8 3 which
imposes criminal penalties on parents who fail to pay court-ordered child support
when that child lives in another state. While the Act is clearly related to the family,
it has been upheld in the circuits because the Act "falls within Congress's power to
regulate a 'thing' in interstate commerce"84 or, perhaps, because of Congress's
power to regulate the failure of an individual to fulfill his or her duty to put
something into interstate commerce. 85
In United States v. Faasse,s6 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
CSRA, denying that the statute "regulate[d] a traditional area of family law best left
the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 849, 893 n. 168 (2002) ("Although Congress can plainly put conditions on the
grants it makes to the States, there must be limits on its exercise of the Spending Clause
power as well.").
113 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000).
'a' United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475,481 (6th Cir. 2001); see also United States v.
Johnson, 114 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997).
Specifically, we agree with those circuits which have held that the CSRA
properly regulates, as a "thing in interstate commerce," the obligation created by
state-court child support orders when, as the Act requires, and as is the situation
in this case, the obligated parent and the dependent child reside in different
states.
Id. at 480; cf Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) ("The United States bases its
Commerce Clause argument on the fact that the personal, identifying information that the
DPPA [Driver's Privacy Protection Act] regulates is a 'thin[g] in interstate commerce,' and
that the sale or release of that information in interstate commerce is therefore a proper subject
of congressional regulation." (citing United States v. Lopez, 514U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995))).
"' See Faasse, 265 F.3d at 486 ("[I]t is immaterial that the CSRA regulates a defendant's
failure to put a thing in commerce."); see also United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454,460 (7th
Cir. 1997) ("[A] parent's intentional failure to pay child support constitutes a conscious
impediment to interstate commerce that Congress can criminalize just as it has other
impediments to interstate commerce.") (citing United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 790
(9th Cir. 1996)); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996).
Sage argues that the Act is not within the Commerce Clause power... because
it concerns not the sending of money interstate but the failure to send money
...If Congress can take measures under the Commerce Clause to foster
potential interstate commerce, it surely has power to prevent the frustration of
an obligation to engage in commerce.
Id. at 105-06.
186 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2001).
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to the states."' 7 The court noted both that the statute "regulates inter-, not intra-
state economic activity"' and that the statute did not even "purport to regulate the
non-economic activities associated with marriage, divorce, or childrearing under the
guise that, in the aggregate, such activities substantially affect interstate
commerce."'8 9 The Faasse court thus upheld the statute without somehow implying
that Congress had limitless powers under the Commerce Clause 9 ' and, further,
showed how the Act did not involve an attempt by Congress to usurp the core
functions of the state with respect to marriage, divorce, and custody.' 9 '
To illustrate how the Court might analyze a treaty involving family matters
where the treaty was going to be upheld, consider how the lower courts have
analyzed the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA),'92 which was
passed to implement the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, Article 19. "' The courts make it clear that under the ICARA, the
courts are to determine whether an abduction has taken place rather than whether
187 Faasse, 265 F.3d at 487-88. A Sixth Circuit panel had previously held otherwise. See
United States v. Faasse, 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000), vacated by 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir.
2000).
Put simply, the CSRA is not about recovery of child support payments avoided
by interstate flight. Rather, the Act regulates, through the criminal law,
obligations owed by one family member to another, using diversity of residence
as a jurisdictional "hook." This realization is troubling, for the States possess
primary authority for defining and enforcing both the criminal law and the law
of domestic relations.
Id. at 664.
l88 Faasse, 265 F.3d at 488.
189 Id.; see also Black, 125 F.3d at 462 ("[T]he CSRA does not attempt to regulate
domestic relations."); Sage, 92 F.3d at 107 ("As noted above, the Act does not attempt to
regulate domestic relations.").
'" But see Faasse, 265 F.3d at 494 (Batchelder, J., dissenting) ("The majority's
construction [of the commerce power] renders the commerce component meaningless. Such
a reading violates the intent of the Framers, and transforms the Commerce Clause ... into
a virtually limitless federal police power, contrary to the Supreme Court's recent holdings
in Lopez and Morrison.").
... Cf. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
A State regulates its domestic commerce, contracts, the transmission of estates,
real and personal, and acts upon all internal matters which relate to its moral and
political welfare. Over these subjects the federal government has no power. They
appertain to the State sovereignty as exclusively as powers exclusively delegated
appertain to the general government.
Id. at 588.
92 See Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing the Hague
Convention and its domestic implementing statute, ICARA); see also Whallon v. Lynn, 230
F.3d 450, 452 (1st Cir. 2000).
13 See Whallon, 230 F.3d at 452 (discussing the Hague Convention).
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an underlying custody award was correctly made. 94 As the Second Circuit noted
in Blondin v. Dubois,95 "the Hague Convention is not designed to resolve
underlying custody disputes."'' 96
In United States v. Morrison,'97 the Court worried that its upholding the civil
provision in the Violence Against Women Act might imply that Congress would
also regulate under the Commerce Clause "family law and other areas of traditional
state regulation."' 98 The Court expressed the same worry in Lopez, namely, were
it to accept the government's reasoning, "Congress could regulate any activity that
it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law
(including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example."1 99 The question at
hand is whether the Court would have similar reservations with respect to treaties
that it viewed as regulating those core areas of family law.
Some multilateral treaties are designed to protect human rights rather than, for
example, secure commercial advantages.2"0 Human rights are clearly a matter of
international concern and thus would seem subject to treaty.2"' Yet, human rights
treaties might also be thought to implicate paradigmatic family concerns20 2 and thus
194 See Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 2001); Diorinou, 237 F.3d at 140.
'1 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001).
196 Id. at 161.
117 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
198 Id. at 615.
9 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995); see also id. at 585 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[I]t seems to me that the power to regulate 'commerce' can by no means
encompass authority... to regulate marriage."); Dailey, supra note 181, at 1789:
Lopez did not directly concern federal legislation on the family, yet the case
provided the opportunity for an otherwise deeply divided Court to unite around
the principle that family law constitutes a clearly defined realm of exclusive state
regulatory authority. Both the majority and the dissent invoked the regulation of
"marriage, divorce, and child custody" as a paradigmatic example of lawmaking
power beyond the constitutional competence of the federal government.
200 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 397 ("[Tlhere are today a host of multilateral human
rights treaties that purport to confer a variety of rights that individuals can assert against their
own governments.").
201 Neuman, supra note 43, at 46-47:
Even if the grant of the treaty power includes some inherent limit requiring
treaties to address matters of legitimate international concern, there can be no
doubt today that human rights are among those matters.... The United States
has not only made human rights conditions in other countries a major focus of
its foreign policy, but has even explained military interventions in other
countries by the need to protect the human rights of their own nationals.
Reciprocal guarantees of human rights subject the United States to international
scrutiny of its human rights record while facilitating American and international
scrutiny of other countries' records.
202 Cf. D. Marianne Brower Blair, The Impact of Family Paradigms, Domestic
Constitutions, and International Conventions on Disclosure of an Adopted Person's
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involve an area that is constitutionally committed to the states.2 °3 Professor Bradley
suggests that ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example,
would undermine state regulation of family law because the Convention "purports
to give children both certain procedural rights as well as substantive rights
concerning such things as expression, belief, association, privacy, [and]
education."24 Thus, the Court might suggest that the Senate could not ratify the
Convention (at least without making the necessary RUDs) or that Congress could
not pass implementing legislation (assuming that the Convention was not self-
executing), precisely because it would thereby regulate an area reserved for the
states."' The claim here, of course, is not that the effort to promote human rights
within this country and abroad should be stopped,2"6 but merely that those
commentators who believe such treaties are immune from constitutional
invalidation because they involve matters of national or international concern20 7 are
Identities and Heritage: A Comparative Examination, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 587, 642 (2001)
(discussing how the "development of human rights treaties and customary norms, as well as
the rapid growth of conventions regulating transnational relationships, has extended the
impact of international law to the realm of family law").
203 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 46, at 400 ("[C]onstitutional principles relating
to federalism suggest that some matters [related to human rights] should be regulated by
state, rather than federal, officials.").
204 Bradley, supra note 8, at 402 n.61; see also Clarke, Jr., supra note 180, at 36-38
(describing how the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child might conflict
with state law in some areas); Resnik, supra note 65, at 666 ("Federalism concerns have also
been proffered as the rationale for the United States's refusal to ratify the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.").
205 See Susan Kilbourne, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Federalism Issues
for the United States, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POvERTY 327, 327 (1998):
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (Convention) deals almost
exclusively with areas of law traditionally thought to be reserved to the states,
and the Constitution affords the federal government only limited power to
legislate in these areas of state concern. The question, therefore, is whether
Congress has the power to pass legislation implementing the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.
Cf Note, supra note 16, at 2478 ("For example, the United States has signed or ratified
agreements requiring extensive changes in areas including family law."). The author of the
Note cited the Convention on the Rights of the Child without discussing the required
implementing legislation. Id. at 2478 n.2.
206 See Golove, supra note 3, at 1302:
The United States enters human rights treaties in order to secure the promises of
other states to abide by basic human rights standards. Obtaining these promises,
and the enforcement mechanisms that accompany them, are widely recognized
as national interests of the highest magnitude, implicating, inter alia, our national
security and economic interests.
207 See id. at 1260 (suggesting that Holland makes clear that treaties may be made as long
as they "[deal] with a matter of national interest").
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not paying close enough attention to the Court's articulated dual-sovereignty
jurisprudence.
B. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: 'The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."2 8 Commentators
seem convinced that the Tenth Amendment does not limit the reach of the treaty
power at all.2"9 Some of the lower courts have suggested that the Tenth Amendment
does not pose much of an obstacle for treaties, although these courts are more
guarded in how they describe the relevant jurisprudence. For example, in United
States v. Lue,21 ° the Second Circuit pointed out that "[s]ince the Treaty Power was
delegated to the federal government, whatever is within its scope is not reserved to
the states: the Tenth Amendment is not material." '' The court explained, "Many
matters, then, may appear to be 'reserved to the States' as regards domestic
legislation if Congress does not have power to regulate them; but they are not
reserved to the states so as to exclude their regulation by international
agreement."212
The Lue Court's observation - that whatever is within the scope of the treaty
power is clearly not reserved for the states - reflects the position articulated by the
Holland Court. Justice Holmes had noted that for those seeking to establish the
unconstitutionality of the migratory bird treaty, "it is not enough to refer to the
Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United States, because
by Article II, § 2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly. ' 2 3 Both the
Holland Court and the Lue Court were careful not to specify what is within the
scope of the treaty power. While both courts made clear that some areas of the law
might be subject to state control absent a treaty, and subject to federal law where
208 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
209 See Neuman, supra note 43, at 46 ("The reach of the separately enumerated treaty
power to matters ordinarily of local concern, free from any 'invisible radiation from the
general terms of the Tenth Amendment,' was settled in Missouri v. Holland."); Vazquez,
supra note 93, at 1319 (arguing that Holland held that there are no Tenth Amendment
subject-matter limitations on the treaty power).
210 134 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1998).
211 Id. at 85.
212 Id.; cf. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 190 (1961) ("[S]tate policies as to the rights
of aliens to inherit must give way under our Constitution's Supremacy Clause to 'overriding'
federal treaties and conflicting arrangements."); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947)
("If, therefore, the provisions of the treaty have not been superseded or abrogated, they
prevail over any requirements of California law which conflict with them.") (citing
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483,488-90 (1879)).
213 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
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a treaty is in place," 4 neither claimed that all areas normally subject to state control
can appropriately be regulated by treaty.
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
suggests:
The power to make treaties conferred upon the President, subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate, is a power delegated to the United
States and is of status equal to that of other delegated powers of the
United States under the Constitution. The United States also has
authority to make international agreements other than treaties.
Consequently, the Tenth Amendment, reserving to the several States the
powers not delegated to the United States, does not limit the power to
make treaties or other agreements."'
However, the Restatement and various commentators"' fail to include qualifications
that the Holland Court and the Second Circuit were careful to make; namely, that
whatever is in the scope of the treaty power will not be protected by the Tenth
Amendment, and that Congress can reach some areas by treaty that it could not
otherwise reach.
To say that whatever is in the scope of the treaty power is not subject to Tenth
Amendment limitations might rightly be criticized as merely asserting a truism and
hence unhelpful. Yet, courts offer such truisms, at least in part, because of the
example set by the United States Supreme Court. In New York v. United States,
21 7
the Court noted that "the text of the Tenth Amendment itself.., is essentially a
tautology' 2 s because the powers of the state governments begin where the powers
of the Federal government end.21 9
Were the Court's view that the Tenth Amendment is simply a tautology, the
Court would be implying that the Tenth Amendment does no work. Basically, one
214 See supra notes 92-93, 108-09 and accompanying text; see also Webb v. O'Brien, 263
U.S. 313, 321-22 (1923) ("In the absence of a treaty to the contrary, the State has power to
deny to aliens the right to own land within its borders.") (citing Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197 (1923)); cf Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217 (1923) ("[W]hile Congress
has exclusive jurisdiction over immigration, naturalization and the disposal of the public
domain, each State, in the absence of any treaty provision to the contrary, has power to deny
to aliens the right to own land within its borders.") (citing Hauenstein, 100 U.S. at 484, 488).
215 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 302 cmt. d.
216 See, e.g., Golove, supra note 3, at 1088 ("If [the treaty power] is a separate 'delegated'
power, then no question of 'reserved' powers under the Tenth Amendment can arise.").
217 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
218 Id. at 156-57.
219 See Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 73 (1989) ("This approach to the Tenth Amendment assumes that the task
is simply to describe the limits of federal power; whatever remains is state sovereignty.").
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would consult other parts of the Constitution to determine the powers of the federal
government, and the Tenth Amendment would simply be an inert reminder that the
states have powers too. Yet, the Court does not view the Tenth Amendment as a
"dead letter" 220 but, instead, as a confirmation "that the power of the Federal
Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the
States."'22' Thus, the Court might well be willing to suggest that the idea behind the
Tenth Amendment, if not the text itself, imposes a limitation on the treaty power,222
and would deny that Holland precludes a Tenth Amendment challenge to the treaty
power.223
In Alden v. Maine,2 4 the Court suggested that "the States' immunity from suit
is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today. ' 2 5 The Court based
its position on the understanding of "the Constitution's structure, its history, and the
authoritative interpretations by this Court. 226 Certainly, the Alden majority's
interpretations of both the Constitution's history and structure, and of the relevant
jurisprudence are controversial and not shared by various members of the Court.
For example, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
suggested in his Alden dissent that the "Court's enhancement of the [Eleventh]
Amendment [is] at odds with constitutional history and at war with the conception
of divided sovereignty that is the essence of American federalism." '227 Yet, the point
here is not whether the Alden majority accurately reflects constitutional history or
the developing state sovereignty jurisprudence, but only that the majority view
220 Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 748-49 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[If
protecting people from unwelcome communications (the governmental interest the Court
posits) is a compelling state interest, the First Amendment is a dead letter.").
221 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
222 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,936 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he
Tenth Amendment affirms the undeniable notion that under our Constitution, the Federal
Government is one of enumerated, hence limited, powers."); White, supra note 111, at 9:
[An] assumption of the orthodox regime of constitutional foreign relations
jurisprudence was that ... the exercise of any foreign relations powers by the
federal government needed to respect the reserved powers of the states under the
structure of sovereignty created by the Constitution. Alongside the treaty-
consciousness of orthodox constitutional foreign relations jurisprudence was a
reserved-powers consciousness.
223 Some commentators seem to read it that way. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 93, at
1319; Healy, supra note 129, at 1727 (discussing writers who believe "that the treaty power,
unlike the Commerce Clause, is not limited by concerns of federalism. Instead, it gives the
federal government plenary power to regulate matters of both national and local concern").
224 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
225 Id. at 713.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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expressed in Alden is likely to have implications for the issues under discussion
here.
Suppose that a case involving the treaty power were to implicate core areas of
state regulation such as family law. It would not be surprising if the Court held that
certain reserved powers of the states cannot be encroached upon by the federal
government because otherwise the state's fundamental sovereignty would be
undermined. The Court would explain that the "limited and enumerated powers
granted to the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the National
Government... underscore the vital role reserved to the States by the constitutional
design" '228 and that the Tenth "Amendment confirms the promise implicit in the
original document" '229 that the federal government will not be permitted to usurp
those powers. Following Alden, the Court would suggest that permitting Congress
to circumvent state sovereignty via the treaty power would undermine "the
sovereign status of the States... [and] the dignity and essential attributes inhering
in that status."23 The Court would conclude that certain core areas of state
regulation cannot be reached by the federal government even via the treaty power."'
C. Article H as Immunizer
Commentators suggest that because the treaty power is located in Article 123.
and the commerce power is located in Article 1,233 -there is good reason to think that
the former, unlike the latter, will not be limited because of federalism concerns.2 34
For support, they can cite Justice Holmes's point in Holland that "there may be
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress
228 Id. at 713.
229 Id. at 714.
230 Alden, 527 U.S. at 714.
231 See id. at 706-07.
232 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.").
233 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[The Congress shall have Power] to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
234 See, e.g., Golove, supra note 3, at 1081 ("A number of provisions are directly pertinent
to the inquiry. Most important is the Treaty Clause itself, which resides not in Article I, but
in Article II."); Yoo, supra note 11, at 818 ("As a textual matter, the Constitution locates
treaties in Article II, which implies that they need not live within the same boundaries that
contain Article I."); id. at 827 ("While treaties should not be self-executing in areas of
plenary congressional authority, they should reach areas that lie outside of congressional
powers due to Article I or Tenth Amendment limits."); Note, supra note 16, at 2481
("Because the sovereignty guaranteed to the states under the Tenth Amendment is defined
negatively, the specific textual delegation indicates that the Framers did not intend for the
residual sovereignty of the states to be a limit on the treaty power.").
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could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, ' 235 which
basically suggests that the treaty power is not limited in reach to those matters
which Congress may regulate pursuant to its Article I powers.236 Yet, the location
of the power may be less helpful than originally thought. Neither Article I nor
Article HI explicitly gives the federal government the power to regulate family law,
and it is not clear that the treaty power broadens the power of the federal
government beyond its enumerated powers in Articles I and 1.237
The Alden Court suggested that the states "retain 'a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty ' ' 23 which must be respected. The Court might well hold a treaty
unconstitutional if it did not "treat the States in a manner consistent with their status
as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation."239
Just as the Court in New York suggested that the Tenth Amendment "directs us to
determine.. . whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation
on an Article I power, ' , 21 the Court might make the same claim with respect to an
Article HI power.
The claim here is not that a limitation on the treaty power is mandated by the
existing jurisprudence, but merely that the Court's current resolve to assure that the
states will be accorded "the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign
entities""24 and the "'respect owed them as' joint sovereigns"24 2 makes it very
unlikely that the Court would agree that the treaty power is virtually plenary. The
Court could hardly claim that the."Constitution preserves the sovereign status of the
States... [by reserving for] them a substantial portion of the Nation's primary
sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that
235 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); see also Vazquez, supra note 93, at
1342 ("The fact is that the power to make treaties is not just the power to make laws on the
same subjects by other means; it is the power to make laws on subjects not otherwise falling
within Congress's legislative power.").
236 See Yoo, supra note 11, at 827 (offering Holland as a partial explanation and
justification for the nonlimitation of the treaty power by the Tenth Amendment); see also
John C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense
of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2218, 2223-24 (1999) ("[T]he Supreme Court
[in Holland] denied that the Tenth Amendment limited the treaty power's scope.").
237 See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
23' Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James
Madison)). For the language itself, see THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 213 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
239 Alden, 527 U.S. at 748.
24 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
24' Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
242 Id. at 765 (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
[Vol. 12:179
MISSOURI V. HOLLAND, AND THE NEW FEDERALISM
status '2 43 if the Constitution would permit that sovereign status, dignity, and
sovereignty to disappear whenever the treaty power was invoked.
The Alden Court noted that "in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people
required the States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had been preserved
to them by the original Constitution."2" The Court thereby recognized that
Congress can, in some circumstances, make use of its Section 5 enforcement power
under that amendment to "assert an authority over the States which would be
otherwise unauthorized by the Constitution." '245 Yet, the treaty power is an
enumerated power discussed in the original Constitution and the Alden analysis
suggests that the treaty power, like the other enumerated powers, would be subject
to the constraints imposed by that original document.
Those advocating a broad construction of the treaty power would not be helped
by the Court's admission that the Fourteenth Amendment expanded federal
power.24 6 That additional "enforcement power is 'remedial' in nature" '247 and would
not seem to affect the breadth of the treaty power, especially given the Court's
current trend towards restricting Congress's powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.24 Both because the current Court views the original
Constitution as incorporating robust protections of state sovereignty and because
the Court has been narrowing the change in the federal-state relationship brought
about by the Civil War Amendments, the Court is extremely unlikely to accept the
current view of most commentators regarding the breadth of the treaty power.
1H. CONCLUSION
The Court has recognized that "the task of ascertaining the constitutional line
between federal and state power has given rise to many of the Court's most difficult
and celebrated cases." '249 Yet, the difficulty in ascertaining constitutional lines has
not prevented the Court from drawing them in the past, and there is no reason to
think that this difficulty will dissuade the Court from drawing them with respect to
the limitations on the treaty power.
243 Alden, 527 U.S. at 714.
'4 Id. at 756.
245 Id.
24 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Says. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
637 (1999) ("'[A]ppropriate"' legislation pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment could abrogate state sovereignty.").
247 Id. at 638.
248 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000) ("[P]rophylactic
legislation under §5 must have a 'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."') (citing Fla. Prepaid Bd., 527
U.S. at 639).
249 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992).
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While clearly believing in the benefits of federalism, 250 the New York Court
suggested that the Court's "task would be the same even if one could prove that
federalism secured no advantages to anyone. '25 ' The Court explained that its task
does not consist in "devising ... [its] preferred system of government, but of
understanding and applying the framework set forth in the Constitution. 252 Thus,
the Court might well limit the treaty-making power, even if national and world
interests might thereby be sacrificed,253 on the theory that the Constitution must be
amended if the Federal Government is to be permitted to regulate certain areas
reserved for the states.
The New York Court recognized that "Congress has substantial powers to
govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States." '254
In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 5 the Court suggested, "As long as it is acting within the
powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its will on the States
... [and] Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States." '256
Yet, the Court was not thereby suggesting that all areas of state law may be
federally regulated.257 Rather, precisely because Congress can only legislate in light
250 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-60 (1991); see also New York, 505 U.S.
at 157 ("The benefits of this federal structure have been extensively cataloged elsewhere.")
(citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457-60).
251 New York, 505 U.S. at 157.
252 id.
253 Some commentators seem too optimistic that promotion of the national interest will
suffice to give Congress the power. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 65, at 530 ("If a decision
is made at the federal level, concurred in by two-thirds of the Senate, that the national interest
would be served by entering into a treaty, then state-centered interests do not justify blunting
federal judicial enforcement of an otherwise self-executing treaty.").
254 New York, 505 U.S. at 162; see also Golove, supra note 3, at 1101:
[F]rom the beginning, treaties have invaded the most sensitive spheres of state
autonomy and consequently have periodically provoked intense resentment and
controversy. Indeed, the most serious conflicts have arisen from treaties
affording rights to aliens and hence interfering with state and local policies
concerning race - a subject which, to put it mildly, was at the core of traditional
notions of state autonomy.
255 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
256 Id. at 460.
257 See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2231 (1998) ("The insistence on an articulable fixed
boundary - of some 'enclave' for state regulation - and the government's inability to
satisfy the Court that its theories provided any boundary between federal and state
governmental authority, are central to understanding the Lopez turn.").
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of one of its enumerated powers,258 there may well be areas that Congress will be
unable to regulate - even in pursuance of a treaty - notwithstanding that the
treaty power exceeds the powers contained in Article I.
Even if the prediction offered here is correct, it is not at all clear how the Court
will go about carving out a protected area. The Court might try to erect some sort
of formal system to determine which areas were not subject to treaty," 9 although
the Justices' differing commitments to formalistic approaches makes prediction
perilous in this area.26 In any event, the current Court takes federalism very
seriously, having suggested that it is so basic that it is something every schoolchild
knows 26' and that it offers basic protections against overreaching by both the state
and federal governments.262
258 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Every law enacted by
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.");
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) ("We start with first principles. The
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.").
259 See Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997
SuP. CT. REv. 199, 200 ("[T]he Court embraces 'doctrinal formalism,' by which I mean the
Court takes a formalist approach to constructing a judicially enforceable doctrine."); cf.
Resnik, supra note 65, at 619-20:
Categoricalfederalism is the term I offer for this form of reasoning. Categorical
federalism's method first assumes that a particular rule of law regulates a single
aspect of human action: Laws are described as about "the family," "crime," or
"civil rights" as if laws were univocal and human interaction similarly one-
dimensional. Second, categorical federalism relies on such identification to
locate authority in state or national governments and then uses the identification
as if to explain why power to regulate resides within one or another
governmental structure. Third, categorical federalism has a presumption of
exclusive control - to wit, if it is family law, it belongs only to the states.
Categories are thus constructed around two sets of human activities, the subject
matter of regulation and the locus of governance, with each assumed to have
intelligible boundaries and autonomous spheres.
260 See Caminker, supra note 259, at 245 ("[lIt is precisely Justice Scalia's devotion to
doctrinal formalism that makes prediction hazardous here.").
211 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) ("As every schoolchild learns, our
Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal
Government.").
2'62 See id. at 458 ("Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of
the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."); see also Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
1, 18 (1988) ("The difficulty with this argument is that it overlooks the purpose of preserving
state autonomy: the principal role of independent state governments is to check the power of
the federal government.").
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Even were the Court unwilling to reserve a particular area categorically for the
states,263 the Court at the very least would require Congress to have a "jurisdictional
hook"'264 before regulating in areas traditionally reserved for the states, and would
likely be quite unwilling to interpret open-ended congressional powers like the
treaty power265 very broadly.266 The claim here is neither that the Court would be
offering the "correct" view nor that the Court could justify its position by appealing
to history, the structure of the Constitution, or even the Framers' intent.267
263 Cf. Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999
SUP. CT. REv. 1, 3 (discussing "'[plower' federalism, which seeks to articulate substantive
limits on federal power, particularly on Congress's power to supplant state regulatory
authority by regulating private conduct directly") (emphasis added).
264 See United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2000) (describing a
federal pornography statute as containing a "jurisdictional hook" because it in some way
made use of the mail or other forms of interstate transportation); see also United States v.
Buculei, 262 F.3d 322, 328-29 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 963 (2002) ("[Section]
2251 (a) contains anexplicit jurisdictional element... [mandating] that the defendant 'knows
or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign
commerce or mailed[.]').
265 See In re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 F. 481,508 (D. Cal. 1880) (noting that "the treaty-making
power is conferred by the constitution in unlimited terms").
6 Cf Healy, supra note 129, at 1740:
[Tihe Court independently identifies point X - the line of state sovereignty -
and declares that federal action past this point is impermissible .... Indeed, [the
Court] declares that protecting state sovereignty is essential to preserving liberty.
It would seem difficult for the Court to surrender that sovereignty simply
because Congress was clever enough to package the Brady Act in a treaty.
267 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ('To
be sure, one conclusion that could be drawn from The Federalist Papers is that the balance
between national and state power is entrusted in its entirety to the political process.");
Golove, supra note 3, at 1078:
Notwithstanding two hundred years of impassioned efforts by states' rights
advocates to deny the obvious, the text and structure of the Constitution, as well
as original intent, leave little room for serious debate. Faced with overwhelming
arguments against their view, states' rights proponents have understandably
chosen to retreat to arguments from first principles rather than attend to careful
analysis of text and structure.
See also Robert Anderson IV, "Ascertained in a Different Way": The Treaty Power at the
Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 189, 194
(2001) ("The Framers, however, considered including a subject-matter limitation on the
Treaty Power - and rejected it."). But see Massey, supra note 219, at 95:
Furthermore, too much emphasis can be placed on The Federalist. The
Federalist essays were basically newspaper propaganda designed to secure an
immediate political result. Like all political campaigners, Hamilton may not have
been above a little strategic prevarication; his principal co-author later admitted
that The Federalist essays were branded with the "zeal of advocates."
[Vol. 12:179
MISSOURI V. HOLLAND, AND THE NEW FEDERALISM
Nonetheless, it is most unlikely26 s that the Court will allow the treaty power to
undermine the limitations that have been imposed on Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause269 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,270 especially
because the treaty power would be a very tempting route27' by which to
circumvent. 2 what the current Court would likely suggest is reserved for the
states.273
268 See Althouse, supra note 75, at 796 ("It is unlikely that today's Supreme Court would
accept the general assertion that the treaty power simply transcends the limits of
federalism."); Michael J. Podolsky, Comment, U.S. Wetlands Policy, Legislation, and Case
Law as Applied to the Wise Use Concept of the Ramsar Convention, 52 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 627,651-52 (2001) ("Notwithstanding conventional wisdom and the fact that Missouri
remains good law, it is important to note that some commentators question the immunity of
the treaty power from federalism limitations imposed on other federal powers such as the
Commerce Clause.").
269 See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's indicia for the
proper exercise of Congress's commerce power). But see Neuman, supra note 43, at 47-48
('The Supreme Court's reinvigoration of the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause in
Lopez is unlikely to foreshadow so radical a change.").
270 See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) ("While preventive rules are
sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means
used and the ends to be achieved.").
271 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 400:
The Supreme Court's renewed commitment to protecting federalism is likely to
increase the importance of the scope of the treaty power. If the treaty power is
immune from federalism restrictions, as the nationalist view maintains, then it
may be a vehicle for the enactment of legislative changes that fall outside of
Congress's domestic lawmaking powers. Indeed, commentators recently have
begun to seize on this possibility.
272 See Althouse, supra note 75, at 793:
Those who think there is no good reason to reserve anything for the states -
perhaps the treaty litigation enthusiasts - may quickly pronounce the treaty
power to be a means of circumventing the federalism limitations on commerce
and Fourteenth Amendment power that recent case law has thrown in the path
of litigants.
273 Cf. White, supra note 111, at 10:
[A]n exercise in foreign relations policymaking undertaken by the federal
government might not be squarely located within one of the enumerated federal
foreign affairs powers, nor be properly analogized to one of them. If so, the
exercise had the potential to radiate into the sphere of reserved state powers.
Such action was constitutionally inappropriate, and judges would need to draw
a boundary line to preserve the integrity of the constitutional design.
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Citing Missouri v. Holland74 and other cases,7 5 commentators suggest that the
treaty power is subject to, at most, a few constitutional constraints, for example,
those specifically guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.276 Yet, those cases do not
clearly establish the virtually plenary nature of the treaty power, and the Court has
been willing to ignore much clearer and more settled case law to implement its new-
found federalism. The Court's recent rediscovery of the Tenth277 and Eleventh
2 7 8
Amendments suggests that the common understanding of the breadth of the treaty
power279 may well have to be reexamined. If the Court continues to subscribe to its
current states' rights jurisprudence, 80 then whole areas of law will likely be viewed
as impermissible subjects of treaties, regrettable international consequences arising
from such a position notwithstanding.
274 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
275 For example, both Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), and Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312
(1988), are cited as cases limiting the reach of the treaty power.
276 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 17:
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the
Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights - let
alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition - to construe Article
VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an international
agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions.
The Reid Court suggested that U.S. citizens were entitled to a civilian trial if being tried by
a U.S. court for a criminal offense like murder. See id. at 20-21.
A different issue would be implicated if the individuals were being tried in a foreign
court. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901):
But such [United States] citizenship does not give him an immunity to commit
crime in other countries, nor entitle him to demand, of right, a trial in any other
mode than that allowed to its own people by the country whose laws he has
violated and from whose justice he has fled. When an American citizen commits
a crime in a foreign country, he cannot complain if required to submit to such
modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe
for its own people, unless a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations
between that country and the United States.
27 In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court struck down a take-title
provision of a statute designed to facilitate the siting of low-level radioactive wastes. In
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), the Court struck down certain provisions of the
Brady Bill which would have commandeered local law enforcement to do the bidding of
Congress.
278 In Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the Court made clear that
Congress's Article I powers could not be used to eliminate state sovereign immunity.
279 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 393 (arguing that conventional wisdom suggests that
"treaties and executive agreements are not thought to be limited either by subject matter or
by the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers to the states").
280 See Yoo, supra note 11, at 817 (discussing the "Rehnquist Court's reinvigoration of
federalism").
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